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To say that the relations between the authorities and the opposition are the topic of the day in Ukraine is to say nothing. Since the “cassette scandal”, which the authorities
declared “exhausted” a year ago, nothing has happened to match the current developments in these relations in terms of significance and emotion.
The opposition, having recovered from its failure in the distribution of positions in the Rada leadership, has decided to have its revenge and “activate” the masses to demand
President L.Kuchma’s early resignation. So it announced the launch of a massive protest campaign on September 16.
The authorities retaliated: at first they resumed criminal proceedings against one of the most active opposition leaders, then they delivered another blow, unexpected and,
therefore, much more unpleasant. We mean “the President’s new initiatives” for reforming the political system regarded by many observers as an “interception operation” rather
than the sincere desire of the head of state to delegate some of his powers to Parliament. In fact, L.Kuchma has voiced the initiatives, which the opposition has always considered
to be its “intellectual property”, thereby embarrassing the latter immensely.
Now the opposition will have to think hard how to make the people understand that it agrees with the essence of the President’s initiatives in principle (since these are its own
initiatives, after all), but at the same time it defies the President himself. L.Kuchma and his new team, in their turn, will have to think of how to account to the population (at least,
before its politically aware part) for this sharp change in “the President’s cause”. First of all, how can the head of state who is constantly humiliating Parliament and reproaching it
for its incapacity to decide, suddenly, to share part of his authority with it? Why has the President finally come to like the proportional election law after having vetoed it six times
in the past?
This seemingly paradoxical situation accurately reflects the controversial relations between the opposition and those in power in Ukraine, relations that have been forming for the
11 years of the country’s independence and have become particularly tense over the last two or three years. It is the study of these relations in the context of international
practices with a view to answer the questions “who is to blame?” and “what is to be done?” that the analytical report “Opposition in Ukraine” prepared by the Razumkov Centre
and published in issue 7 of the “National Security and Defence” magazine is focused on. In this article we highlight some of the key points made in the report, which might
interest our readers on the eve of the upcoming “unrest” of September 2002.
“Who are “the people’s friends” and how they fight against…”
Paradoxical as it may sound, neither political scientists, nor politicians have so far formulated any clear and comprehensible criteria of the opposition in terms of the Ukrainian
political system. In our situation this is a practical, rather than theoretical matter.
Not once have we seen the authorities, in times of political upheaval, try to reduce the opposition to the leftist wing of the political spectrum or “appoint” an opposition, or else
develop theories of “real” and “false” opposition, of “selective” opposition, of the opposition “having specific recognizable faces”.
Being in opposition is defined as rejecting the political course pursued by the authorities, therefore it seems essential to analyze which of Ukraine’s power institutions develop and
implement this political course.
The official version of the matter is this: according to Article 85 of the Constitution of Ukraine, the Supreme Rada of Ukraine is responsible for laying down the principles of the
nation’s domestic and foreign policy. The Supreme Rada also approves the action programme of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (Article
161) is in charge of the implementation of the state’s home and foreign policy.
In fact, however, it is the President of Ukraine who determines the political course of the country almost exclusively. First, his election platform, which dictates the main
direction of the nation’s domestic and foreign policy, is directly legitimized by the citizens’ vote, irrespective of their party affiliation. Moreover, the
incumbent President, L.Kuchma, does not belong to any party, and in the people’s opinion he is not related to (and, thus, not dependent on) any.
This does not mean that a presidential candidate’s election platform effectively and fully describes what the candidate will actually do when in office and what the outcome of his/
her activity may be expected. There is no guarantee that the presidential elections in this country are held in a fair and transparent manner, either. Yet on the face of it, this is how
things stand. Second, the scope of the President’s constitutional powers enables him to control the entire executive vertical (from the Cabinet of Ministers to
local state administrations), which de jure is not subordinated to him, and use it to implement the political priorities set in his own election platform.
Besides, the head of state makes all the important personnel appointments in the executive power system, in particular those of the government members, heads of the Security
Service of Ukraine, State Tax Administration, etc. In this way, the President makes sure that the appointed bureaucrats are totally devoted to him.Third, Ukraine’s political
system lacks the legally established status of the parliamentary majority in the Supreme Rada entitled to form the government and appoint the Prime
Minister.
The parliamentary majority is formed under the President’s close supervision, both direct and indirect, aimed to ensure the loyalty of the highest legislative body to the head of
state. This is how the majority was formed during the “velvet revolution” of 2000; this is how “the majority of the defeated” was formed after the 2002 parliamentary election.
Given a weak judiciary power and a poorly structured Parliament, the presidency acquires exceptional weight in the system of the state power branches, which, in effect, turns the
President into the sole embodiment of power in the country.
Thus, the currently existing system of state power does not allow for the meaningful participation of political forces (especially those in opposition) in the
development and implementation of the political course. Understandably, an opposition cannot exist under such conditions, dependent, in fact, not even on
the personality of the President, on his being democratic or non-democratic, but rather on the state power system defined in the Constitution and on a
political tradition and regime established over certain amount of time.
In the Ukrainian context, the criteria of opposition universally recognized in countries with a parliamentary form of governance, such as “attitude to the government” and “attitude
to the parliamentary majority” are dependent on one major criterion - their attitude to the President’s policy.
Therefore, being in opposition in Ukraine should presuppose (1) a clearly articulated and publicly expressed critical attitude to the head of state’s policy; (2) non-participation in its
implementation (i.e. the refusal of the representatives of oppositional parties or blocs to occupy official positions in the Presidential Administration, the Cabinet of Ministers and
other central executive power bodies).
This brings the CPU, SPU and Yuliya Tymoshenko’s Bloc together in one united political camp (united by the principle: rather “against” than “for” the President). It is obvious that
this part of the opposition initiated the September 16 action aiming to force Kuchma’s resignation and to press for a change in the system of power. It is also obvious that if the
opposition succeeds in achieving its goal, the parties and blocs comprising it will hardly stay united in the next presidential election and nominate a single candidate. Their
ideologies and economic platforms are too different; their leaders’ personal ambitions are too pronounced. Moreover, different opposition forces differ in their vision of the
required transformations in the system of power.
The outcome of an expert survey and nationwide opinion poll conducted by the sociological service of the Razumkov Centre show that for both political experts and the
population, being in opposition implies renouncing the head of state’s political course.
According to the poll results, the oppositional party (bloc) is the one “declaring the necessity of changing the President of Ukraine and reforming the executive power system”.
43.2% of respondents hold this opinion, a figure overwhelmingly exceeding the number of those who believe that in order to be oppositional a party (bloc) is to stand for the
resignation of the government and to vote against governmental draft laws in Parliament (26.3%). Even fewer citizens associate being oppositional with the parties’ abstaining
from participation in the permanent parliamentary majority (13.9%) or with their non-representation in the government and local state administrations (13.7%).
By the same token, the majority of the surveyed experts (48.5%) believe a political party’s (or bloc’s) “declaring the necessity to change the President of Ukraine and reform the
executive power system” to be the main criterion of referring to it as the opposition.
Having defined what being oppositional means, we are now in a good position to identify the oppositional forces themselves. In today’s Ukrainian Parliament these are Yuliya
Tymoshenko’s Bloc, the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU), the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) and Victor Yushchenko’s Bloc “Our Ukraine” (according to some experts, the last
two can be considered oppositional with certain reservations).
“VOX POPULI” or What Ukrainian citizens think about the opposition
The transformations that Ukraine’s society has undergone over the last eleven years have revealed certain social groups that are the most discontented with the existing system
of power (these are not only employees, agricultural workers, some categories of intellectuals, but also a larger part of entrepreneurs interested in the state’s providing a level
The transformations that Ukraine’s society has undergone over the last eleven years have revealed certain social groups that are the most discontented with the existing system
of power (these are not only employees, agricultural workers, some categories of intellectuals, but also a larger part of entrepreneurs interested in the state’s providing a level
playing field for all). The authorities cannot afford to ignore their opinion.
At the same time, President L.Kuchma and his associates have never been capable of treating the opposition and its leaders impartially, or at least neutrally (let us remind you of
their openly hostile attitude to the “Kaniv four”). Before the last elections, the leader of the election bloc “For a United Ukraine!” V.Lytvyn stated: “The opposition does not enjoy
the support of the population” (UNIAN, 23 February 2002).
The authorities are, evidently, trying to play down the role of the opposition, to delay the legislative definition of its status, rights and guarantees. As we said at the beginning, the
authorities’ latest step was aimed at snatching the initiative from the opposition and intercepting its political slogans, but even in this case none of the pro-presidential political
forces has publicly claimed responsibility for meeting or failing to meet these commitments. And L.Kuchma, having proposed these changes, afterwards shifted responsibility onto
Parliament, his message being “you go ahead and form a majority; as for me, I am ready for a coalition government”.
In spite of the authorities’ resentful attitude to the opposition, public opinion testifies that there is a social need for a political opposition in Ukraine. The results of the
all-national poll carried out by the Razumkov Centre confirm this.
57.7% of our compatriots consider that the opposition is critical for the normal functioning of society and the state is obliged to guarantee its rights. As few as 16.7% of
respondents disagree with this view, while another 25.6% found this question difficult to answer. Of course, the share of citizens recognizing the need for an opposition is
relatively small for a developed democracy. Yet for Ukraine, the very fact that the majority of its citizens accept the need for an opposition is unparalleled in
importance. The citizens are reluctant to massively support the opposition not only because they disapprove of what it stands for, but also because they have lost confidence in
politics and politicians as such, and they no longer believe in the opposition’s ability to overcome the authorities who keep the situation in society under their total
control.Society’s attitude to the opposition is also more positive than negative. Thus, 42.6% of respondents maintain that Ukrainian society will benefit from
the opposition’s active involvement in political life; 22.9% of them think society will not benefit, but it will not lose, either; and only 9.2% fear lest the
opposition should do harm to society. 45.4% of respondents agree, in full or in part, that the opposition has a favourable impact on the situation in the
country, while 23.6% doubt it.
The reaction of society to the authorities’ treatment of the opposition is also interesting. For example, during the last election campaign V.Lytvyn, leader of the bloc “For a United
Ukraine!”, argued that there was no opposition in Ukraine “other than the leftist one”, the rest being “people who had lost their power and taken offense” (UNIAN, 9 February
2002). One of the previous ZN issues reported the “oppositional ratings” ascribed by experts and the population to various political forces (you will remember that not only the
leftists figured among the most radical oppositional parties, but also the right-centrist Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc).
Over one third of the respondents (36%) fully or partially agree that the opposition is a group of politicians who used to be in power but were later removed from office and are
now striving to return to the ruling circle. About the same number of people (34.7%) hold the opposite opinion. Presumably, such a controversial attitude of the population to the
opposition leaders is conditioned, on the one hand, by the huge information and propaganda pressure the state-owned pro-presidential mass media are exerting on the mass
conscience in an attempt to form a negative image of the opposition, and, on the other hand, by some of the politicians’ rapid shifting from the opposition to the ruling power and
vice versa.
34.7% of respondents do not share the opinion that the opposition has no clear-cut ideological platform uniting both the extreme right and extreme left politicians, whereas
27.3% of them do.
The thesis that “the opposition has no constructive ideas or programmes apart from criticizing the President and the government and destabilizing the overall situation” was
supported by 27.1% of the poll participants and discarded by 42.4% of them.
And finally, 30.9% of our citizens do not think that “the opposition receives little support from the population and relies on funding from the West”, while 23% say they agree with
the statement. Naturally, the former figure might have been much bigger but for the brainwashing campaign unleashed in the state-controlled media. Suffice it to mention a
documentary called “PR” and shown by several national TV channels, which deserves a prize for meeting the highest standards of “black PR”.
The support of western democracies to countries in transition is usual international practice. They are sincere in their desire to see democratic relations established between the
authorities and the opposition in Ukraine, and they facilitate the process by providing informational and consultative assistance to the opposition forces, acting strictly within the
framework of Ukrainian legislation. In so doing, the Western countries advocate the rights of even those opposition parties whose ideology they themselves do not share, for
example, of the leftists - the CPU, SPU (especially in what concerns NATO expansion eastwards, private property on land, and so on).
Summing up, Ukrainian citizens are aware that society needs the opposition and is changed for the better by its activities.
“If the enemy doesn’t surrender…”
The authorities, highest state officials, do not openly challenge the principle, according to which an opposition is regarded as an indispensable component of a democratic political
system.
However, in practice, those in power still view the opposition political parties not as their political opponents but, rather, as their political rivals, and in fighting
with these rivals they are ready to resort to whatever means are available to them.
The “cassette scandal” revealed to the fullest possible extent the lack of the authorities’ will, preparedness and desire to engage in a meaningful dialogue with the opposition. It
was then that rude pressure was used against the opposition, and the country’s top leaders qualified its activities as a “threat to national security”, which is unacceptable for a
democratic state. The authorities failed to guarantee the transparency of the investigation in Gongadze’s case and lacked the stamina to acknowledge their mistakes during the
“cassette scandal”. On the contrary, the events developed under intense informational and police pressure. In September 2002, P.Symonenko, O.Moroz and Yu.Tymoshenko, in
their capacity as MPs, sent an official letter to the chiefs of the Ministry of Interior, Security Service of Ukraine and the Prosecutor General’s Office claiming they knew about the
provocations that the authorities were, supposedly, ready to organize during the September 16 rally. Meanwhile they demanded to be given TV time on the state-owned channel
UT-1 so that they could enlighten the citizens about their motives and goals in calling for this action. Preparing for the action “Arise, Ukraine!” the three opposition leaders held
meetings with their electorate in the regions of Ukraine, but none of the national TV channels reported about any of these meetings, including the one in Chernihiv attended by
almost 15 thousand people.
On the other hand, the opposition itself sometimes behaves recklessly, the best example of such behaviour being their collision with the police not far from the building of the
Presidential Administration on 9 March 2001. This clash laid bare the opposition leaders’ lack of control over their supporters’ actions and disappointed the population, the majority
of whom favour peaceful methods of conflict resolution.
Public opinion adequately reflects the nature of the relations between the authorities and the opposition. 11.8% of respondents think there is open confrontation between the
two; 19.5% believe the confrontation is latent; 17.6% see neither confrontation nor cooperation in their relations. Only 3.2% of the poll participants think that the authorities and
the opposition cooperate in a constructive manner, while another 13.4% consider the two effectively collaborate in addressing certain issues.
37.9% of respondents agreed, fully or partially, that the authorities in Ukraine “are trying to suppress the opposition sparing no means”, and 22.2% disagreed with the statement.
Interestingly, half of those who noted the lack of cooperation between the authorities and the opposition tend to hold both sides accountable for the situation, 14.9% think it is
the authorities’ fault, and only 3.3% blame it on the opposition.
The experts rated the character of the relations between the authorities and the opposition at 2.1 (against the scale of 5 where 1 is “open confrontation”, and 5 is “fruitful
cooperation”).
In our opinion, these figures mirror the actual situation in Ukraine: the political struggle between those in power and the opposition has acquired the scale of a “hot” political war,
let alone a “cold” one. And though neither of the parties is entirely blameless, the authorities are more responsible for the situation.
Since there is no effective public control of the authorities, the officials are so accustomed to their position of power that they cannot imagine their ending up in the opposition.
They cannot comprehend that the opposition is not “parties” but people like them, highly qualified professionals who, due to circumstances, happened to be on the “other side of
the barricade”. The latter, in their turn, are gradually inclined to “demonize” everybody they associate with the authorities. As a result, their relations create a vicious circle
precluding any dialogue, since both sides claim they cannot cooperate with “the absolute evil”, and a political struggle turns into a “fight for life”, sometimes for physical survival.
In the country’s political practice, the authorities have targeted their blows against the opposition in the following ways.Limiting the opposition’s influence on the state
power bodies. For instance, the leftist opposition was deprived of the possibility of shaping the activities of the Supreme Rada when in January-February
2000 the pro-presidential majority was forcibly formed in Parliament. When in September 2002 the agenda was created by the second session of the
Supreme Rada of the fourth convocation, almost all of the opposition’s proposals were ignored, including those concerning the initiation of the
impeachment of the President of Ukraine, addressing the issues of pressure on the judiciary, of illegal arms trade, etc.
After the 2002 election, from April 1 till July 10, the President removed from office 85 heads of the district state administrations. About one fourth of them were given the reasons
After the 2002 election, from April 1 till July 10, the President removed from office 85 heads of the district state administrations. About one fourth of them were given the reasons
for their discharge (being elected to the representational bodies, retirement, transfer to another position, and the like). About 20 of them were released “on handing in their
resignation” (which makes one suspicious of this massive desire to quit). As for the rest of the heads of district state administrations, they were fired without any explanation.
We compared the geography of these dismissals with the election results. In 33 districts where the heads of administration were fired “Our Ukraine” won the election, in other 33
districts it was the CPU and in 7 more - the SPU. The bloc “For a United Ukraine!” was far behind (ranking 3rd and sometimes even 5th). In 12 of these districts in did not even
overcome the 4% barrier.
It is noteworthy that the socio-economic indicators in the districts where the heads of state administrations were dismissed were not poorer, and sometimes even better, than the
average in the country. The rotation of local officials based on an assessment of their political reliability, is still under way… Restricting the opposition’s access to the mass
media. As stated above, the opposition in Ukraine is practically deprived of access to the state-owned electronic media. Under pressure from the authorities
the non-state media present the opposition’s activities in a limited and often biased fashion. The newspapers published by the opposition parties suffer
from political censorship, endless checks and audits by the fiscal authorities, eviction from their offices, confiscation of property, limited distribution
opportunities, etc.
Recently, for example, the TV Channel UTAR associated in public opinion with the opposition Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc has stopped broadcasting; the law enforcement authorities
are presently conducting an unplanned audit of the financial activities of the Internet publication “Ukrainian Pravda”, and Ye,Prytula, editor-in-chief of this newspaper, has sent a
letter to the Prosecutor General’s Office stating her life is in danger.
Lately, the authorities, having understood that an aggressive informational policy targeting the opposition fails to yield the expected results (according to
the poll carried out by the Razumkov Centre in August 2002, 58.8% of the population do not trust the information about the opposition and its leaders
broadcast by the national TV channels), have changed their tactics, giving preference to an information blockade. To illustrate this, let us remind you how the
national channels ignored the press conference by the four opposition leaders on September 2. The conference attracted over 500 reporters, 17 cameramen were recording the
event, but only two channels dared to show a few second’s reel to cover it. The police just would not let the journalists’ buses coming from some regions (Dnipropetrovsk and
Odessa oblasts, for example) in Kyiv. Limiting the opportunities for the oppositional parties to hold rallies and other events. Since the organizers of meetings,
marches, rallies and similar events need permission for holding it, local authorities often deny such permission to the opposition parties on various,
sometimes flimsy, pretexts. For example, in the time of the “cassette scandal” the authorities tried to neutralize the opposition by banning its marches in the
centre of Kyiv arguing that they were concerned with the “preservation of the historical part of the city” and “environmental protection”. In February 2001
units of the riot police “Berkut” removed the tent camp set up by the opposition in the main street of the capital.
In September 2002, Kyiv mayor O.Omelchenko displayed a wry sense of political humour suggesting that the opposition should hold its civil protest actions at the “Chaika” stadium
on the outskirts of the city. It is clear that under the conditions of an information blockade, it will strip the event of its anticipated political effect.
The public was also startled to hear warnings by the Minister of Interior Yu.Smirnov about “mentally handicapped people inclined to aggressive behaviour”, “criminal offenders and
hooligans” showing interest in the September 16 rally. We would like to believe these warnings reflect the Minister’s true concern about public order and security, including that of
the rally participants, and will not be used as an excuse for the militia’s provocations and the use of force against the protesters. Curbing the activities of the opposition
party leaders. In their interaction with the opposition the authorities have adopted the practice of slandering the opposition party leaders, bringing
pressure to bear on them, for example, in the form of the so-called “selective prosecution” when a certain pretence is used to prosecute a person on
selected charges, this step being widely publicized in the official media. Thus, the “Batkivshchina” (Fatherland) Party leader Yu.Tymoshenko was detained
(on a charge of offences allegedly committed in 1995-1996) right at the peak of a sharp confrontation between the authorities and the opposition (in winter
2001) and kept under arrest for more than a month, which noticeably undermined the effectiveness of the opposition’s actions. Today’s situation is very
similar: as soon as the opposition had announced its plans to conduct the protest action on September 16, the Prosecutor General’s Office applied to the
Supreme Rada asking to lift Yu.Tymoshenko’s parliamentary immunity. The working group of the Supreme Rada Regulations Committee overruled the
petition as groundless.
Public opinion correctly assesses the situation. According to the poll results, our countrymen and countrywomen are convinced that the following rights of the opposition are
infringed in Ukraine: the right to free access to the media (31.9% of respondents), the right to a share of leading posts in Parliament (27.2%), the right to public political activity
and mass actions (21.6%). Almost half of the respondents (46.7%) think that the pro-presidential political forces have better access to the media than the opposition; 24.2% of
them estimate that all political forces have equal access to the media, and 4.3% suppose that the opposition enjoys a freer access to the media.
“Who is to blame?”
There are a number of factors impeding the transformation of the opposition in Ukraine into an influential and legitimate political institution and the resolution of problems in its
relations with the authorities.
First of all, these are the specifics of Ukraine’s political system. As mentioned above, the political system in Ukraine does not provide for the political parties’ active
participation in forming the executive power bodies, both nationally and locally, thereby limiting their opportunities to influence the development and implementation of public
policy. This applies primarily to the opposition parties deprived even of insignificant non-institutional means of influence (for instance, concluding behind-the-scene agreements,
lobbying personnel appointments, etc) available to the parties loyal to the authorities. The Supreme Rada is not empowered to form the government. Therefore, the
parliamentary majority cannot be held responsible for the government’s actions and the minority cannot be entitled to criticize the majority for the results
of the Cabinet’s activity. In other words, in our country there are no conditions in place for the functioning of a “classic” parliamentary majority and
opposition.
The political structure of the Supreme Rada itself remains undefined, since it lacks any mechanisms to regulate the political responsibility of the MPs elected on the proportional
basis for changing factions, and since half of the MPs, i.e. those elected in the majority constituencies, are free to change factions as they please.
The “evolution” of the present Rada structure is yet more evidence of its instability. Thus, initially, the number of factions in the newly elected Parliament corresponded to that of
the parties and blocs having successfully overcome the 4% barrier, and the non-allied deputies accounted for a small share of the MP population. Later, however, the “great
migration” of this population started. A number of factions and deputy groups representing powerful regional financial and political clans were formed on the vestige of the
“United Ukraine”, thus confirming the opposition’s suggestion that this mega-faction had been united around the single task of getting V.Lytlyn elected Chairman of the Supreme
Rada and distributing the parliamentary committees to the benefit of the pro-presidential forces.
Today the “United Ukraine” faction has nine members and is likely to be dissolved. In this case, who will be responsible for fulfilling this bloc’s campaign promises to the voters?
Can the people be fooled again?
So the political structure of Parliament is still unstable, and we do not think that there is any chance of forming a sustainable majority in this Rada before 2004, irrespective of who
might initiate its formation - “Our Ukraine” or the pro-presidential forces. Firstly, it is unclear what ideological principles this majority will share. Secondly, given the personal
ambitions of their leaders, the factions will never be able to divide the portfolios, so the majority will collapse before it becomes operational. Thirdly, one should bear in mind that
the head of state has his own ideas as to the composition of the coalitional government (without the formation of which the establishment of a majority is out of the question)
.The oppositional parties in Ukraine constitute an integral part of a multi-party system and, therefore, suffer from the same ills - fragmentation, lack of
connection with the voters and mechanisms of accounting to them, affiliation to financial clans, etc.
The following data characterize the citizens’ will to render practical support to the parties they voted for at the election. As few as 13.8% of respondents expressed their
determination to participate in the actions organized by the party they voted for. 22.5% of respondents will take part in such actions only if they affect their own interests. The
majority of people (57.6%) will not be involved in the protest actions. At the moment, neither the head of state and other high-ranking officials nor the opposition
party leaders are psychologically prepared for dialogue. One can hardly visualize L.Kuchma sitting at the same table with O.Moroz and Yu.Tymoshenko.
Their relations of “mutual exclusion” (either impeachment of the President or imprisonment for Tymoshenko) rule out any possibility of a compromise. The
reason should be looked for in the undeveloped democratic political culture of the society, including its political elite (both in power and in opposition), the
perennial Soviet stereotypes like “who is not with us is against us”. The antagonism is often caused by the personal ambitions of the officials and the
opposition members alike or by their conflicting economic interests rather than by a difference in their vision of the country’s future development.
In this situation, all attempts to establish certain organizational frameworks for a dialogue between the authorities and political parties, including the
opposition ones, are aimed to disguise the reluctance of both sides to reach a compromise. For example, numerous committees and commissions were set up under
the President of Ukraine with the purpose of interacting with political parties on a permanent basis (the latest such structure was the Ukrainian Political Consultative Board).
However, their activities were geared, for the most part, to supporting decisions and steps already made by the President. Even when invited to sit on these boards, the opposition
party representatives could not influence the decision-making process there, since they were always in the minority.
Ineffectiveness, or rather, absence of any effective mechanisms for cooperation between the authorities and the opposition was revealed in full during the “cassette scandal”. At
that time a “round table” was organized on the initiative of the Ukrainian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs to bring together the representatives of power bodies and the
opposition anti-presidential parties, but neither the former nor the latter were authorized to make decisions. Moreover, from the very start of the “round table” discussion neither
side demonstrated a genuine interest in reaching any sensible agreement.
opposition anti-presidential parties, but neither the former nor the latter were authorized to make decisions. Moreover, from the very start of the “round table” discussion neither
side demonstrated a genuine interest in reaching any sensible agreement.
International practice, on the contrary, proves that dialogue between the government and the opposition can be useful for both sides. Thus, in Chile an agreement was reached
between A.Pinochet’s proponents and the opposition on reforming the system of power, in particular of the dictator’s personal power, and on holding elections. In Poland, a
“round table’ was organized between the communists and the democratic opposition, which facilitated greatly the country’s transition to a market economy and democracy.
Assessing the preparedness of the country’s top officials and executive power structures at large to engage in dialogue with the opposition (against a scale of 5 where 1 is “very
low” and 5 is “very high”), the experts awarded the highest rate to the Cabinet of Ministers (2.55). It is followed by local state administrations (2.46), the President of Ukraine
(1.97) and the Presidential Administration (1.89). The figures require no comment.The lack of the legally established status of the opposition (particularly, the
parliamentary one) diminishes its ability to propose alternatives to the executive power’s political course. Some opposition parties have difficulty placing
themselves within the system of relations “authorities-opposition”; they are opposed to a person (the incumbent President) rather than to the authorities’
ideology or programmes.
Due to the above, the opposition, incapable of maintaining constructive relations with the authorities, proves unable to perform the functions vested in it by a democratic society.
The expert survey data validate this conclusion.
The following is the experts’ assessment of the opposition parties’ (blocs’) ability to propose alternative development programmes and suggest ways of resolving burning societal
issues: Viktor Yushchenko’s Bloc “Our Ukraine” - 3.32; Yuliya Tymoshenko’s Bloc - 3.08; SPU - 2.91; CPU - 2.52 (against the scale of 5 where 1 is “poor” and 5 is “very good”). The
opposition in our country has not been able to produce sound alternative programmes not because it lacks expertise and skills but because the authorities have always turned
down the oppositions’ ideas and proposals (except for the times when they could use those ideas to weaken the opposition) and have never acknowledged the authorship of the
latter.
In the experts’ opinion, the SPU (3.42) is the most efficient in promoting the interests of the social groups dissatisfied with the activities of the central power bodies; it is followed
by the CPU (3.19), Yuliya Tymoshenko’s Bloc (3.16) and Viktor Yushchenko’s Bloc “Our Ukraine” (2.87).
Viktor Yushchanko’s Bloc “Our Ukraine” takes the lead in the experts’ ratings regarding the fulfillment of the following functions: “facilitating the qualitative change in the power
elite” (3.04), “searching the effective ways of resolving political and social conflicts, showing a will to negotiate with the authorities” (3.51), “urging the power bodies to greater
efficiency, openness and transparency” (3.42).
Yet, unfortunately, according to the experts, none of the opposition blocs or parties has managed to perform any of the oppositions’ major functions well enough to deserve a
“good” rating. This is troubling, since an effective democracy in Ukraine is impossible without an effective opposition“What is to be done?”
A radical reform of the existing political regime, of the means and methods of exercising state power is vital for the Ukrainian opposition to become
effective and civilized, since, given the President’s excessive powers, a weak Parliament and dependent judiciary, any politician, no matter how democratic
he/she might be, will be tempted to use similar authoritarian methods and suppress opposition as soon as he/she assumes office.
The state and political reform should balance the powers within the triangle “President - Parliament - Government” and ensure the transition to a parliamentary-presidential
republic. A parliamentary model that proved workable in developed democracies should be introduced in this country as well. According to this model, “voters elect representatives
of political parties to parliament - party representatives form a majority - the majority takes an active part in forming the government - the majority-constituting parties bear a
political responsibility for the results of the government’s activity - the parliamentary minority (opposition) has a right and the opportunity to publicly criticize, control and adjust
the government’s actions by proposing policy alternatives”.
In practice, the following steps should be taken:
• the adoption of a new law “On Elections of the People’s Deputies of Ukraine” by the Supreme Rada to introduce the proportional system of parliamentary elections;
• the introduction of amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine envisaging: (1) the redistribution of powers in the triangle “President - Parliament - Cabinet” in favour of
Parliament and the government; (2) a procedure enabling the parliamentary majority to form a government; (3) a greater responsibility of the parliamentary majority for the
government’s actions;
• the introduction of amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine stipulating that an MP’s desertion of his/her party faction should entail the termination of powers of this People’s
Deputy if he/she was elected to parliament on the party list. The Supreme Rada Regulations should state that a faction formed by a party that overcame the 4% barrier at the
election cannot be dissolved;
The rights of the oppositional minority should be clearly defined to include the following, most essential, ones:
• the right to be represented in the leadership of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine, in particular in its committees and commissions, in other bodies elected or appointed by the
Supreme Rada of Ukraine - the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine, Board of the National Bank of Ukraine, the National Council of Ukraine for Television and Radio Broadcasting, the
Constitutional Court of Ukraine, The Highest Board of Justice of Ukraine, as well as in parliamentary delegations for establishing and maintaining international parliamentary
relations proportionally to the number of these faction members;
• the right to initiate the convening of an extraordinary plenary session of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine;
• the right to draw up the agenda of a session of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine once a month, on a day designated by the Regulations;
• the right to have opposition MPs appointed deputy heads of the Supreme Rada committees, specifically those for budget issues, freedom of speech and information, legal
support to law enforcement, combating organized crime and corruption;
• the right to make official statements (oral and written) with regard to any matter considered in the Supreme Rada of Ukraine (within the time allocated on every day of plenary
sessions);
• the right to present a report (co-report) on the most essential issues considered in the Supreme Rada of Ukraine (on fundamentals of the domestic and foreign policy of Ukraine;
on Action Programme of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine; on Report of the Cabinet of Ministers to Parliament and its responsibility; on the draft State Budget of Ukraine and
fulfillment of the State Budget of Ukraine; on impeachment of the President of Ukraine, etc).
At the same time, it would not be sensible to overestimate the importance of a merely legislative regulation of the opposition’s status. What matters most in the process of a
civilized opposition’s establishment and development is the freedom of all political players, especially the authorities, and a level of general political culture in society. The question
is whether the logic of common sense can finally overcome the inertia in the relations between the authorities and the opposition. Unfortunately, today’s situation leaves little
room for hope. Yet hope dies hard, they say.
* * *
The all-national poll was conducted on 21-28 May 2002. 2015 citizens at the age of over 18 were surveyed in all regions of Ukraine..
The expert survey was carried out on 3-18 June 2002 and covered 105 experts (employees of the Presidential Administration, Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers, Office of the
Supreme Rada, public research institutions, non-governmental organizations, leading political journalists).
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